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TWO CANADIAN CASE STUDIES
AND AN AMERICAN DIGRESSION
By S. A. BELLAN*
A. INTRODUCTION
It has been observed that politics and religion do not admit of rational
discussion and for this reason these topics should be avoided in polite com-
pany. Perhaps another subject should be added to the list - compulsory
arbitration - for here, too, reason seems a meagre bulwark in the face of
the volatile response usually evoked by the suggestion of a compulsory
arbitration system. A quotation from the AFL-CIO bulletin is illustrative:
Once this nation starts down the path of compulsion as a way of life, it will not
stop with workers. The history of every dictatorship proves that once a govern-
ment is allowed to compel workers to labour against their will, it inevitably uses
the weapon of compulsion against employers, and ultimately, all citizens ...
But free workers if they are to be free must have the right to strike.1
Compulsory arbitration, broadly speaking, connotes a system under
which both parties must submit their differences to arbitration for resolution
in lieu of the right of each to inflict economic harm - via a strike or lock-
out - on the other. Compulsory arbitration, in theory and practice, embraces
numerous variants, usually engrafted on the "free" collective bargaining sys-
tem at different points. That is, the parties may be compelled to invoke
compulsory arbitration if a settlement has not been reached within a specific
time limit from the commencement of negotiations, after conciliation, media-
tion, a cooling-off period, etc. It should be noted that compulsory arbitration
represents one end of the spectrum, free collective bargaining the other, with
voluntary arbitration and ad hoc legislative intervention falling somewhere
between. This paper is intended to explore one such arbitration variant
final offer selection.
While final offer selection may be adopted voluntarily by the parties
themselves or imposed by legislation, the criticisms are generally similar.
Opponents declare interest disputes unsuited for arbitration; a third party
imposed settlement would lack the "acceptability" of a negotiated agreement;
multiple non-compatible issues embodied in a single offer force an "unrea-
sonable" choice either way; both offers may be patently "unreasonable",
* Ms. Bellan is a member of the 1976 graduating class, Osgoode Hall Law School.
1AFL-CIO Legislative Department, "Compulsory Arbitration", In Transit (April,
1972).
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dictating a selection contrary to the public interest. The following quotation
is apposite:
While such a system is said to encourage reasonableness by both parties, it is
actually gimmickry which encourages poker playing. Sweetly reasonable and un-
palatably sour proposals may often be intermixed in each party's offer, but the
arbitrators are powerless to select only the reasonable elements. Furthermore,
even if under such a system it may be said that the parties deserve what they get,
the ultimate award carries with it little promise of stability. Anyone with labour
relations experience knows that wherever a winner and a loser may be identified,
the leadership of the loser is likely, if only to regain face, to cause trouble.2
In contrast to conventional arbitration which usually employs a "compromise"
or "saw-off" principle in reaching a settlement, under final offer selection the
arbitrator must choose the entire proposal of either party; in bald terms this
is how the "game" is played - and in equally blunt language, the model has
been denounced as "Russian roulette". Curiously enough, this model has
generated more names than applications. That is, final offer selection is also
referred to as "forced choice", "either-or", "last best offer", "sudden death",
"all-or-nothing", "one-or-the-other", "winner-take-all". Yet FOS has been
rarely utilized in Canada. This essay focuses on the two recent Canadian
applications of FOS - the settlements of the high school teachers and Boards
of Education in Wentworth County and Sault Ste. Marie. Material is primarily
drawn from interviews with the parties.a For clarification, the terms the
"teachers" and the "Board" refer to the chairmen of the respective negotiating
committees unless a broader meaning is indicated either specifically or in
context.
13. THE WENTWORTH COUNTY DISPUTE
On April 16, 1974, the negotiating committees of the Wentworth County
teachers and Board of Education initiated discussion of the ground rules to
govern salary negotiations for the 1974-75 contract. When agreement on
these ground rules was reached on May 13, the parties were committed to
final offer selection as the method of resolving their differences if "collective
bargaining" should fail.
It should be noted at this point that the "bargaining" in question is
excluded from the ambit of The Ontario Labour Relations Act (O.L.R.A.)
2 M. Bernstein, Daily Labour Report. #245, A-4, December 21, 1971.
a In the Wentworth County dispute, the Chairmen of the Teachers' and Board's
Negotiating Committees - Mr. W. Schaefer and Mr. T. Burton, respectively - were
interviewed. Unfortunately, it was impossible to reach Judge Robin Shea, the arbitrator,
as he was recovering from an illness. However, he was not required by the parties to
give reasons for his selection beyond stating that all evidence properly submitted was
taken into consideration. I would further like to thank the other teachers and Board
members for their cooperation in answering my questions. In the Sault Ste. Marie
settlement, Mr. D. Forsythe of O.S.S.T.F., who was instrumental in preparing the
teachers' brief was interviewed in person while Dr. L. Lukenda of the Sault Board was
contacted by telephone. Mr. G. Ferguson, the arbitrator selected in the case, kindly
made available his comprehensive arbitration award indicating the rationale for his
choice of proposals and, further, his paper (as yet unpublished) regarding final offer
selection.
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by virtue of s. 2(f). Theoretically, each teacher is bound by an individual
contract of employment with his local Board. In practice, however, the
Boards have "discussed" salary structures with teachers' negotiating com-
mittees - with the admixture of "bargaining" and "paternalism" varying
with the locality. Teachers, denied the right to strike legally under the Act,
have resorted to various "pressure" tactics - work to rule, mass resignation,
withdrawal of voluntary services, and such like - to enhance their position
in salary disputes. Both parties agreed that the system functions poorly at
present but the type of legislative response desired obviously differs. The
consensus among teachers seems to favour inclusion in the O.L.R.A., while
the Board appears to be concerned with protecting their constituents - the
taxpayers - from "footing the bill" for high wage settlements.
Briefly summarized, final offer selection was to follow the mediation
phase in negotiations according to the following ground rules (see
Appendix A):
1) after the lapse of the mediation deadline (i.e., three weeks) the final
offer of each side on all outstanding negotiable items was to be submitted
to a Selection Officer;
2) the Selection Officer was to be chosen by mutual agreement or random
selection from a panel of four names submitted by each side;
3) each submission was to indicate the position of the committee prior to
mediation, issues settled during mediation and the final position;
4) the Selection Officer could require written clarification of either submission
but no changes in the final positions were permitted; the decision was to
be totally in favour of either final offer;
5) the decision - in writing and binding - was to be handed down within
30 days; the Selection Officer was not to be required to justify his deci-
sion beyond stating that all evidence properly submitted was taken into
consideration.
The adoption of the ground rules represents a blend of several factors.
The personal predilections of Mr. W. Schaefer, Chairman of the Teachers'
Negotiating Committee, whose contact with the model in a course in in-
dustrial relations led to his strong espousal of FOS, provided the initial
impetus. The Board's first response was decidedly cool; the teachers felt their
proposal was considered "Mickey Mouse" although the Board perceived
their own reaction as cautious. The Board seemed to be persuaded to agree
to FOS upon learning that the model had been incorporated into the ground
rules of the Ottawa County Board for the past three years (although negotia-
tions had been settled without recourse to FOS) and upon the concession of
the teachers embodied in Rule 31 that,
as a prerequisite condition of acceptance of the foregoing procedures, it is agreed
that no sanction, mass resignation, withdrawal of any normally performed service,
lockout or other action of a similar nature shall be imposed by either party.
In 1971, the teachers had instituted a work to rule campaign to support
their wage demands which had resulted in considerable bitterness and ill-
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feeling among the teachers, Board, students and parents. Neither party wished
to repeat this experience. In fact, the teachers felt this concession was decisive
in convincing the Board to approve the ground rules. While the Board stated
the barrring of sanctions was not critical, it seems that this was quite
influential.
4
After agreement on the ground rules, negotiations dealing with salary
grids and working conditions proceeded without significant success until the
intervention of the Mediator, Mr. T. Mancini, on August 29, in accordance
with Rule 20. Here, again, the parties' perceptions differed: the teachers felt
the mediator was of "some" assistance while the Board considered the
mediation phase "very productive", i.e., the teachers' working conditions
were deleted, discussion of a 16 month agreement was broached, and the
financial records of the Board "opened" to "clear the air". The Board's policy
had been to adhere strictly to The Schools Education Act regarding dis-
closure of accounts, etc. This had aroused some ill-feeling as the teachers
claimed the Board's spending had been well below the expenditure ceiling
set by the Ministry and, thus, the wage increases could readily be afforded,
yet the teachers could not fully substantiate their case unless the data was
made available.5 In response to the increased disclosure of financial informa-
tion, the teachers moderated their demands for the remainder of 1974 but
pushed for a substantial increase in 1975. 6
The parties continued to negotiate after formal intervention by the
mediator for the three week period prescribed by the ground rules before
the FOS procedures were to become operative. And, in fact, settlement was
reached on all major items before the deadline. The salary grid was
tentatively agreed upon at a teacher-Board meeting held in the absence of
the mediator. On September 20, the District 36 teachers ratified the "ten-
tatively agreed upon items" by a vote of 71 per cent and rejected the Board's
offer on four items (which subsequently went to arbitration) by a vote of
89 per cent.
Both parties reported considerable pressure was generated by the FOS
4 It is of interest to note that the teachers felt that their promise regarding the
banning of sanctions was not believed by the Board. Considerable tension was created,
the result of which could have eroded the confidence in the "good faith" bargaining of
the other party and prompted an emotional response. It seems, however, that the
distrust stemmed from a few individual Board members and that the Board Negotiating
Committee firmly considered the teachers "honour-bound".
The Board's income is derived from grants from the Ministry of Education and
the municipality. Should the local Board "pierce" its expenditure ceiling, i.e., the total
budget, the Ministry may impose a penalty equal to the amount of excess spending. In
the instant case, the Board had consistently aimed at a budget approximating the "grant
ceiling" (about 60-70 per cent of the total figure) and, hence, as the teachers suspected,
funds had accumulated and were available to satisfy the wage demands.
GThe 16 month agreement was adopted to dovetail the contract term with the
Board's fiscal period which is set by the Ministry and coincides with the calendar year.
Previous contracts ran from September to August with serious budgetary problems for
Boards trying to maintain ceilings and/or estimate expenditures for the following year.
[VOL. 13, NO. 3
Final Offer Selection
deadline after mediation, viz., each preferred to reach agreement through
negotiation rather than risk a complete loss in arbitration. The Board ad-
mitted to the bargaining tactic of "keeping something back" for mediation
and conceded that the mediation stage may have delayed agreement. Thus,
at the arbitral stage, the following issues were left unresolved:
1) responsibility allowances for Department Heads, Assistant Department
Heads, and Minor Heads;
2) salary scales for Principals and Vice-Principals;
3) cumulative sick leave; and
4) extra degree allowance.
But, as was later revealed, the financial differential was a mere $23,000 of a
total county educational budget of approximately $22 million.
As the negotiating committees were unable to agree on a Selection
Officer, each side presented a panel of four names with the new stipulation
(requested by the Board) that the nominees be limited to the county court
judiciary to ensure some measure of neutrality. Each side objected to two
of the other's nominees and these names were deleted. Judge Robin Shea was
selected by lot from the four remaining names.
As mentioned earlier, Rule 27 required both parties to place their sub-
missions before the Selection Officer. It is interesting to note that Rule 31
of the Suggested Ground Rules provided for the exchange of briefs between
the parties as well. This stipulation was omitted from the final procedures,
probably through inadvertence. The Board expressed the opinion that in
view of the few issues unresolved and the narrow gap between the parties
such an exchange was unnecessary. It seems logical that the greater the
disparity and the more numerous the issues, the more likely it would be that
the parties would press for openness. The Board frankly admitted that the
amount "at stake" at arbitration considerably influenced the tactics chosen
in preparing their submission to Judge Shea.
Under Rule 29, the Selection Officer was not required to justify his
decision beyond stating that all evidence properly submitted was taken into
consideration. The suggested ground rules had merely stated that all evidence
should be considered. The alternative phrasing seems to indicate a desire to
limit somewhat the scope of the Selection Officer by excluding possible criteria
of selection not presented by either party, e.g., a general governmental anti-
inflationary policy. And, further, while both parties stressed the "reasonable-
ness" of the offer as the sole criterion for the arbitrator, each side elaborated
this concept in its written submission. The Board emphasized "comparability"
as the preeminent criterion, viz., comparability of wage packages with Boards
in similar localities with like enrolment levels. Reference to expenditure ceil-
ings was omitted as the wage grid had been settled and the budget parameters
secured. However, the Board agreed that if the award might have "pierced"
the ceilings (with possible Ministry penalties), this factor would have been
1975]
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forcefully urged upon the arbitrator as almost conclusive of the case.7 The
teachers cited practices in surrounding Boards as justification for the increases
in responsibility allowances, i.e., other Boards hired subject consultants, per-
sons to prepare teaching resources and such like while these duties in Went-
worth were assumed by Department Heads, Assistant and Minor Heads.
Again, the proposals for salaries of principals and vice-principals refer to the
salary grid accepted in the adjacent Hamilton secondary schools. The argu-
ment for the extra degree allowance was based on the rise in costs of obtaining
such a degree and the lack of change in this figure since 1969-70. Thus, not
unexpectedly, the employer-Board defined "reasonableness" as what com-
parable employers were paying and the Board's ability to pay (that is,
recognizing the constraint of the expenditure ceiling) while the employee-
teachers viewed "reasonableness" with reference to salaries of employees (not
necessarily teachers) in the immediate area, teachers in adjacent districts
and cost of living increases.
The Board also indicated that the narrow gap obviated the need for
written reasons for the Selection Officer's choice but that they would prefer a
written judgment if only because it afforded the 'losing' party an opportunity
to challenge the decision if the Officer had acted on "incorrect" or "irrele-
vant" evidence.
8
Judge Shea selected the teachers' offer as "most reasonable"; the teachers
became the "designated winners" and the Board the "designated losers". Both
parties, however, were pleased with the results of their "experiment". The
Board commented that the winner-loser title was irrelevant in view of the
narrow disparity between the parties' offers - a mere $23,000.
The perceptions of the parties of the process of arbitration by FOS
may be summarized as follows:
1) both reported significant convergent pressures to appear "reasonable"
in the eyes of the Selection Officer, particularly after the mediation phase;
2) both sides felt strongly motivated to settle the agreement themselves -
for personal satisfaction and to avoid the risk of complete loss at arbitra-
tion; and yet, both felt that FOS gave the parties a larger measure of
control than did conventional arbitration;
3) both parties believed that the FOS deadline (with its criterion of "rea-
sonableness") set the tone for "civilized" bargaining from the outset and
that they felt that less emotion and grandstanding was displayed during
negotiations and less animosity remained after settlement than in previous
years;
7 This, of course, raises the issue as to whether the Ministry, in setting expenditure
ceilings, is establishing the upper limit of "reasonableness" for the arbitrator or whether
the arbitrator should treat the budget as one factor but not necessarily determinative
of the matter (or perhaps ignore such constraints as artificial).
8 Judicial review of arbitration awards is a controversial issue at best, but here,
where the arbitration is consensual, not statutory, the court would likely require
manifest evidence of error before intervening.
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4) the teachers felt that the FOS device operated to equalize bargaining
positions whereas formerly they had felt "underdogs" in a more pater-
nalistic setting;
5) both felt that the time frames - set in advance - prevented a stalemate
from developing and kept talks progressing (albeit slowly at times); both
heartily endorsed the banning of sanctions during negotiations;
6) in the school system, sanctions such as work to rule rapidly generate a
heated response from parents and students adding to the difficulties at
the bargaining table; further, the teachers here were reluctant to risk
splitting their own ranks or penalize students by imposing sanctions (the
bitter schism of the Windsor teachers, between those who walked out
and those refusing to strike, was cited, as well as the acrimony resulting
from a work to rule campaign in the district in 1971);
7) both parties felt compelled to justify their positions during negotiations
by reference to "concrete" financial data in preparation for the FOS
criterion of reasonableness; indeed, both reported that the FOS deadline
encouraged "realistic!' bargaining throughout;
8) both favoured use of FOS for the next round of contract talks.9
Some criticisms were also noted. The Board would have preferred item by
item selection rather than the total package and intended to press for more
restrictive guidelines if FOS is used again, such as, requiring a written deci-
sion from the Selection Officer, item by item selection, confining FOS to
monetary issues and outlining criteria for the arbitrator. While both parties
felt the response of the media, particularly, the Hamilton Spectator, was
positive and supportive, each thought the public generally understood little
of the FOS procedure. The teachers expressed some disquiet at a few press
releases categorizing their demands as "outrageous" prior to the award,
although after the decision, the Board officially commented that it was
"happy" with the settlement. Again, because of the lack of widespread knowl-
edge of FOS, the teachers experienced some difficulty in communicating
effectively with their own constituency. The teachers did express the reserva-
tion that any proposal in an inflationary situation that coped with cost-of-
living rises could yet appear "unreasonable" in terms of FOS.
But the parties by and large were well pleased with FOS and deserve
praise for their willingness to initiate a novel procedure in a most orderly
fashion.
C. THE SAULT STE. MARIE DISPUTE
The imposition of expenditure ceilings in 1971 considerably altered
negotiations between the teachers and the Board. Whereas the teachers pre-
viously had accepted the offer which they felt most closely approximated the
9 As the composition of the teachers' Negotiating Committee changes annually,
however, it is as yet uncertain whether FOS will be adopted; informal feedback, though,
seems positive.
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monies available to the Board, by the commencement of negotiations in
early March of 1974 the teachers felt their position relative to other wage
earners in the community had been seriously eroded.
Fearing protracted and hostile bargaining sessions, the teachers proposed
final offer selection early in the negotiations. The Board resisted a commit-
ment at this time partly because of the "newness" of FOS; the system was
virtually untried in Canada. Both parties did resolve to turn to mediation
and if necessary, voluntary arbitration modelled on FOS if a deadlock de-
veloped during negotiations; the teachers further agreed not to invoke any
sanctions during the term of the current agreement, that is, not until August
31, 1974.
The imperceptible progress achieved after nearly two months of bar-
gaining prompted the teachers, on May 10, to overwhelmingly approve a
withdrawal of voluntary services effective September 1, 1974 should the
contract not be settled by that time. Talks continued until June 26, adjourned
for the summer, resumed on August 27 and then broke off on September 4
when the teachers' request for a cost of living increase was ignored. Relations
were further exacerbated as the Board, angered by the imposition of the
threatened sanction, refused to pay the grid increment 0 claiming the collective
agreement had expired on August 31 and the teachers responded with a
civil suit.
The services of Mr. T. Mancini, the mediator requested by the Ministry
of Education, proved fruitless. Pressure, however, was building: the students
staged a "walk out" on three occasions to protest the elimination of the
extracurricular activities, football in particular; a number of teachers wished
to resume the extracurricular programme despite the stalemate in negotiations
out of concern for their students. Both sides wanted some device to end the
teachers' sanction, break the impasse and yet "save face".
The solution was final offer selection. On October 8, 1974, Mr. D.
Lawrence, President of the Sault Ste. Marie Division Ontario Secondary
School Teachers' Federation forwarded the following proposal to Dr. L.
Lukenda, Chairman of the Board of Education:
1) The withdrawal of voluntary services would cease;"
2) negotiations would be resumed on October 10 and 15, and extended upon
mutual agreement for October 16 and 17;
3) if the dispute was still unsettled, outstanding items would be submitted
to a single arbitrator, mutually acceptable or appointed by the Ontario
Labour Management Arbitration Commission, if necessary;
10 The salary structure for teachers forms a matrix or "grid", that is, the salary
of an individual teacher at any point in time is determined by integrating two factors -
the number of years of teaching experience and the "group level", representing the
academic qualifications.
11 It should be noted that on settlement of the contract, the teachers implemented
a full extra-curricular programme, including special scheduling of "spring" football in
cooperation with NOSSA.
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4) the arbitration would be restricted to money on the grid, responsibility
allowances, extra degree allowances, principals' and vice-principals'
salaries, the principals' expense allowances, death benefits, and the
benefit plan;
5) items tentatively settled prior to the date negotiations broke off would be
deemed finalized; items agreed upon during the resumption of negotiations
before the arbitrator was appointed would be deleted from the list in (4);
6) within two weeks of the last day of negotiations, the final offer of each
party, with written argument, would be submitted to the arbitrator and
released to the other;
7) within the next ten days, a rebuttal limited to a reply to points raised in
the other's argument would be likewise submitted and released;
8) the arbitrator, on the basis of the written and oral evidence presented,
would make his award by selecting the entire final position of either party
without amendment or alteration.
The Board accepted the proposal; the parties were looking to FOS to succeed
where six months of intensive, often bitter negotiations had failed to produce
a contract.
With FOS adopted, the parties resumed negotiations on October 10 and
15 and succeeded in resolving three issues, namely, the principals' expense
allowance, death benefits, and the benefit plan.
As prescribed in the terms of arbitration, the parties submitted written
briefs and rebuttals regarding the five remaining issues, i.e., money on the
grid, responsibility allowances, extra degree allowances, principals' and vice-
principals' salaries. At the hearing on November 21, viva voce evidence was
adduced concerning the updating of statistical data already submitted and
settlements reached in areas referred to in the briefs (but not offers as yet
unaccepted). Both this Board and the teachers requested that the arbitrator,
Mr. G. Ferguson, provide written reasons for his award. Both parties asked
that the award be handed down as soon as possible; in fact, the decision with
written reasons was released approximately three weeks after the hearing.
The terms of reference for the arbitrator contained no guidelines beyond
the stipulation that the award was to be based on the evidence presented
and constitute the entire package offer of one party. However, the teachers
submitted a highly sophisticated brief and rebuttal amounting to 45 and 20
pages, respectively, setting out in detail the statistical data and suggested
criteria for selection. Under the heading "Criteria for Determining Facts in
Awarding an Arbitration Decision", the teachers reviewed the criteria cited
in the Welland County General Hospital dispute (1965), the "Vancouver
formula" used by the Nechako teachers, the Windsor Board-teacher arbitra-
tion and the Wellington County Separate School case. Criteria which were
impossible to analyse in quantifiable terms were rejected. The following
factors were put forward:
1) recent secondary school salary settlements in the area;
2) recent salary settlements for other teachers and other public service
employee groups;
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3) trends in the cost of living;
4) the employees' right to share in the increase in productivity;
5) trends respecting the relative position of various employees within society.
Extensive statistical data were marshalled to buttress the teachers' request
for an 11.8 per cent increase across the salary grid and for monetary
allowances: grid comparisons with the Board's offer, teachers' proposal and
recent school settlements, including the settlement with the Sault elementary
school teachers; rate comparisons with Board of Education secretarial staff,
Sault constables and firefighters; information published by the Canada De-
partment of Labour for the second quarter of 1974 regarding base wage
rates established by collective bargaining settlements for various industries;
the Consumer Price Index reflecting the cost of living spiral; the Gross Pro-
vincial and National Products; purchasing power indices; career earnings
of Sault secondary school teachers and police constables; a longitudinal
survey of Sault wages for teachers, police, firefighters and an "industrial
composite". The teachers vigorously asserted that comparison with non-
teacher groups was essential to preserve the relative position of teachers
within society, i.e., both to incorporate the cost of living increase and the
real growth of the economy. Finally, the teachers maintained that the ex-
penditure ceilings were irrelevant to the issue:
The arbitrator must not be put in the invidious position of having to decide
whether a board can afford to pay what is necessary under the circumstances.
Boards have the responsibility and authority to adjust budget priorities in what-
ever fashion they choose .... If the Board, in fact, cannot honour its obligations,
then it is the Board's responsibility to approach the Minister .... They cannot
simply explain that the Ministry does not provide enough money and then expect
teachers to accept only the amount of money which the Ministry does provide.
12
The Board's presentation was not nearly as comprehensive or detailed.
Indeed, the Board commented that individual school boards are seriously
disadvantaged in arbitration in comparison with the resources of Ontario
Secondary School Teachers' Federation whose staff and research facilities
are available to the teachers' bargaining units. On the issue of across-the-grid
increases, the Board argued that a consistent percentage increment benefited
the senior staff in the higher salary brackets far more than those in the
junior levels. Thus, the Board's salary proposal differed in percentage in-
crease for each step in the grid.
As in the Wentworth case, the arbitrator selected the teachers' final
offer. Before the arbitral award, the teachers felt that the Board was attempt-
ing to discredit them unfairly in the eyes of the community; their "victory"
was viewed as a tremendous morale boost, that is, that their argument
appeared fair and reasonable to a neutral third party. The teachers speculated
that the award enabled the Board to shift responsibility for piercing the
expenditure ceilings to the arbitrator. However, D. Lukkenda, Chairman of
the Board, candidly stated that the government ceilings could not "tie the
hands" of the arbitrator as this would effectively emasculate the procedure.
He did concede that as the Board is an elected body, an arbitration decision
12 The teachers' rebuttal to the Board's submission, at 8-9.
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necessitating an increased tax rate might prove more palatable to the con-
stituents than a negotiated settlement requiring such an increase. The Board,
though, felt that the teachers had benefited by the rather drastic changes oc-
curring in the economy over the negotiation period; that is, whereas 10 per
cent migit appear a generous settlement in the spring, by the fall such a
figure was inadequate to cope with the spiralling cost of living.
The arbitrator, Mr. G. Ferguson, delivered a comprehensive and lucid
arbitral decision clearly outlining those factors influencing his selection of
the teachers' offer. The negotiating history of the parties, including the tactics
adopted by both sides (i.e., the withdrawal of voluntary services and refusal
of salary increment) and the items settled or withdrawn before arbitration,
were deemed irrelevant; questions of past "fault" were outside the present
determination. Further, the freedom of the arbitrator to seek data on his own
initiative was closely circumscribed:
I do not believe that I have the right to seek outside information or advice or
to consult with experts in the educational field. I must base my decision on the
evidence which is placed before me by the parties.13
Further, that the teachers' offer would pierce the expenditure ceilings
and possibly subject the Board to financial penalties was expressly rejected
as outside the ambit of meaningful consideration of the offers of both parties
on the merits. It should be noted, though, that the offers were relatively
close: for example, the minimum-maximum offers for principals' and vice-
principals' salaries respectively were $25,735 to $27,835 and $22,060 to
$24,160 for the Board and $25,994 to $28,006 and $22,192 to $24,205 for
the teachers. Additional comparisons of the Board's and teachers' offers are
detailed in Appendix B. It should also be mentioned that the Board's final
offer likewise pierced the government ceilings.
Ferguson pointed to the following factors as determining his selection:
1) statistics proving that there had been a substantial increase in the cost
of living in 1973 and 1974;
2) the comparison of the percentage amount of increases which had been
paid to teachers and the percentage increases given to industrial workers
in Sault Ste. Marie in the last five years;
3) settlements which had been negotiated in collective bargaining in Ontario
in 1974;
4) the obvious conclusion that the purchasing power of a teacher occupying
the same position on the salary grid had eroded due to changes in the
cost of living;
5) the offer of the Board for increases to the responsibility allowance ap-
peared to be unreasonably low;
6) the teachers' offer was based on a consistent application of an increase
of 11.8 per cent for each level on the grid.14
The Board had compared total salaries of teachers at two different levels
Is G. Ferguson (unreported) at 5.
141d. at 11.
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of experience on the salary grid in formulating its offer. Ferguson designated
part of the differential an "experience allowance", separate from the per-
centage increment across the grid and preferred the teachers' proposed
consistent increase of 11.8 per cent to the Board's varying percentages. With
regard to the principals' and vice-principals' salaries, Ferguson indicated that
as almost one quarter of such teachers were at the maximum position in the
grid, the teachers' offer better coped with the cost of living increase. The
reduced purchasing power of the dollar and the possibility of further devalua-
tion over the next years were important factors. The Board's contention that
the teachers' proposal was dangerous or inflationary was rejected as an
allegation without evidentiary foundation beyond a general labelling of any
wage increase to a substantial number of people as "inflationary".
The teachers, as expected, were well pleased with the result but indicated
that they would have preferred to settle the dispute themselves. The Board,
too, was generally satisfied with the award, although there was continued
disagreement with the arbitrator's rejection of the Board's increment pro-
posal in the favour of the "consistent" offer of the teachers.
D. COMPARISON OF THE WENTWORTH
AND SAULT NEGOTIATIONS
The obvious difference between the Wentworth and Sault negotiations
is the point of adoption of final offer selection, viz., the Wentworth teachers
and Board provided for FOS in their ground rules before initiating salary
negotiations whereas in the Sault dispute, FOS was implemented as ad hoc
device to resolve an impasse in bargaining. In both instances, the impetus
for adoption of FOS came from the teachers; the Boards were initially
reticent and agreement to use FOS was linked with teachers' sanctions - in
the Sault after the imposition of the withdrawal of voluntary services and in
Wentworth in return for an undertaking not to impose any sanctions.
The procedural aspects of the arbitration process itself presented some
interesting contrasts. Wentworth preferred to guarantee some measure of
neutrality in the arbitrator by requiring that nominees be county court judges
and selecting by lot if none was mutually acceptable; Sault provided for
appointment of an arbitrator by the Arbitration Commission should the
parties fail to agree. (It should be noted that a Commission appointment of
an arbitrator was not required.)
Neither required written reasons in the terms of reference although the
Sault teachers and Board did request a written decision from arbitrator G.
Ferguson. Both groups confined arbitral discretion to consideration of the
evidence presented. The Wentworth Board did indicate that they would press
for written reasons in the next round of negotiations if FOS were again
utilized. Similarly, an exchange of briefs and a possibility for rebuttal - as
provided for in the Sault arbitration - would likely be preferred by the
Wentworth Board particularly if the number of items going to arbitration
was significant.
Again, neither group specified criteria or guidelines in the terms of
reference for the arbitrator. The Wentworth Board's negotiators referred to
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"reasonableness" as the touchstone of the arbitrator's selection; however,
both the teachers and the Board elaborated "reasonableness" with reference
to the financial data of "comparable" schools and/or other sectors in the
community. Both parties in the Sault case were silent regarding criteria in
the instructions given to the arbitrator. The teachers, though, presented a
comprehensive statistical analysis of wage settlements and explicitly outlined
the criteria they viewed as determinative after reviewing several arbitral deci-
sions. The Sault Board indicated that it would have preferred initial agree-
ment on criteria to be used by the arbitrator in selecting the offer. The
Board felt that restrictive and predetermined criteria, for example, exclusion
of wage settlements outside of Ontario, would obviate the problem of the
O.S.S.T.F., with its greater resources, innundating the arbitrator with data
while the Board could not finance an equally sophisticated brief.
In each case the arbitrator was directed to choose the entire offer of
one party rather than an item by item consideration. The Wentworth Board
expressed a preference for this latter form especially if both monetary and
non-monetary items remained unresolved before arbitration. The Sault Board
and teachers, however, felt that such a selection would encourage a resort to
the "saw-off" principle of conventional arbitration; that is, the arbitrator
would attempt a "compromise" solution or more palatable decision by
balancing his choices.
Both commented on the "reasonableness" of the costs involved as well;
in the Sault case, the oral hearing lasted only three hours, whereas in Went-
worth, written briefs were submitted without viva voce evidence and Judge
Shea declined to submit a fee for his services claiming the exercise was part
of his "public duty".
The parties to the Wentworth dispute reported considerable pressure to
adopt a realistic, objective bargaining stance throughout and to settle as
many items as possible rather than risk loss at arbitration. While the time
period between adoption and implementation of FOS in the Sault case was
extremely short, the three bargaining sessions did resolve the remaining
peripheral items, leaving the major monetary issues for arbitration; apparently
neither side wished to chance a loss at arbitration over their stance on a
relatively minor point. The Wentworth negotiators, further, experienced a
definite reduction in the emotionalism that had characterized earlier contract
disputes. In the Sault, as well, the parties felt that the necessity of preparing
a written brief to convince a neutral third party of the merits of their offers
tended to force both sides to adopt a more realistic position without posturing
for effect.
Finally, in both disputes the arbitrator selected the teachers' offer; the
teachers, not unexpectedly, were well pleased with the outcome, but the
Wentworth and Sault Boards, too, strongly endorsed the final offer selection
route. The possible implications of these two instances of FOS in Canada for
"free" collective bargaining are discussed in the concluding section of the
paper.
1975]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
E. AN AMERICAN DIGRESSION
Legislation has been enacted in several American states' 5 implementing
FOS for employees in the public sector. In addition, ad hoc statutes and
voluntary agreements have turned to FOS to resolve bargaining impasses.
This section is intended to review briefly the FOS experience in Indianapolis,
Eugene (Oregon), and Wisconsin and Michigan. The first is an example of
consensual arbitration, the second of a city ordinance, and the third of state
legislation. Implications of these experiences are discussed in the conclusions
of the paper; this section is predominantly descriptive.
1. Indianapolis
On February 22, 1972, after five months of negotiations, the City of
Indianapolis and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees agreed to resolve their contract dispute through final offer arbitra-
tion. The procedures were modelled on Bill 280 in the Indiana Senate (which
was not enacted into law), i.e., the arbitration panel was to "select the most
reasonable in its judgment, of the final offers submitted by the parties, and
such final offer shall be the binding contract between the parties" and "not
to compromise or alter the final offer which it selects". 16 Of critical im-
portance was the stipulation that the available financial resources of the State
agency represented, in effect, the upper limit on reasonableness in that an
award which necessitated deficit financing was prohibited.
The final offer of the parties may be outlined summarily:
1) wages: the city proposed a 5.5 per cent increase (representing an average
wage rate of $124 per week); the union demanded 7.6 per cent (roughly,
$128 per week).
2) health care: the union wanted the city to absorb the increases in Blue
Cross premiums instituted in 1971 and 1972; the city resisted on
budgetary grounds - that this item alone would cost approximately
$90,000 - and on the legal argument that state law restricted public
employers to contract for group insurance for its employees, i.e., the
Attorney-General had indicated that the applicable statute excluded cov-
erage for dependents under the Blue Cross Family Plan;
3) the union asked for an extra week of sick leave per year for service for
employees who exhausted their sick leave for hospitalization and recovery;
the city proposed that the 12 day maximum be continued although it was
willing to permit employees to take unused sick leave when injured on
the job;
4) the union wanted a full day's pay for employees when weather conditions
prevented work; the city offered 4 hours' pay;
5) the union demanded time-and-a-half for work in excess of 8 hours per
day; the city proposed overtime for work in excess of 80 hours in a two-
week period;
1r That is, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and a city
ordinance in Eugene, Oregon.
10 Daily Labour Report, #95, B-2, May 16, 1973.
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6) the union requested weekly pay cheques for certain comparatively low-
paid employees; the city wished to continue its bi-weekly pay schedule;
Item 5 was clarified during arbitration and agreement reached between the
parties. Further, discussion with respect to item 3 reduced cost estimates from
$50,000 to $11,712 yearly; this issue might have been settled during negotia-
tions if not for the ambiguity of the union proposal.
The two member arbitration panel first tested the individual proposals
of each party against the standard of "reasonableness". The Board thought
that the union wage demand of 7.6 per cent was reasonable given wages for
employees in comparable classifications in private industry. That the wage
demand of 7.6 per cent exceeded the 5.5 per cent standard of the Pay Board17
was held not conclusive of the issue. Finally, the Board felt the public interest
was in no way jeopardized and funds were available. The Board favoured the
city's position on item 4 and the union's proposal on item 6. The possible
illegality of the demand for: Blue Cross premiums for dependents was dis-
regarded: "whether the union's proposal is legal or illegal, the Board must
deal with it on its merits".' 8 But the panel warned that other arbitrators might
well feel the violation of Federal or State law "unreasonable" by definition
and conclusive of the selection.
The city's package was selected on the grounds that the costs of the
Blue Cross premiums and sick leave amounted to $101,712. The union's
offer thus represented a labour cost increase of 10 to 12 per cent.
The Board held that the city could not produce the funds needed to provide an
increase of this size without impairing an orderly and efficient operation of its
government and thus jeopardizing the public interest.19
Additionally, the Board emphasized that
... even in collective bargaining in private industry, the Board takes judicial
notice that contracts calling for such an increase are not currently being
negotiated. ... Clearly, a contract which is 'reasonable' does not depart from
the mainstream of what is currently the practice in industry. To be 'rea-
sonable', a contract must conform to the general character of wage and fringe
settlements.20
In making the award, the Board chafed under the restriction of FOS
and would have preferred the discretion to compromise or at least select
among the proposals. This suggests that where a number of issues are to be
resolved, including monetary and non-monetary factors, item by item selec-
tion might be indicated as a means of introducing some flexibility while
somewhat excluding the "saw-off" principle, since no compromise was
allowed on any one item. It should be noted, however, that the union and
the employees accepted the decision in good faith; no strike or other sanctions
'7 The Pay Board, established in 1971 by an Executive Order of the United States
President, was intended to develop and establish criteria and standards for the stabiliza-
tion of wages and salaries in an effort to combat inflationary pressures.
.8 Id. at B-3.
19 Id. at B-5.
20 Id.
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(i.e. slowdown) resulted. In fact, the national headquarters of the union re-
mained positive: "We think the decision is an important one because it lays
down a precedent for ad hoc solution procedures for municipal disputes, as
an alternative to (strikes) .21
2. Eugene
In 1971 Eugene city council enacted the city ordinance establishing
final offer selection for public service employees. A rigorous bargaining-
arbitration timetable is delineated so that contracts are coincident with the
fiscal year and are finalized before the annual budget adoption deadlines in
May and June. Briefly, the first stage of "good faith" bargaining is followed
by mediation (which may be mutually waived), then "official" negotiations
lasting 25 days. If no agreement is reached, each party submits a final offer
and one alternative offer comprising the entire proposal or limited to specific
items remaining unresolved. After five further days of negotiation, if no
settlement is reached, the arbitration procedure is invoked. Of interest is the
provision that "parties may continue to discuss these offers until agreement
is reached or a decision rendered by the tripartite arbitration panel".2 The
panel is mandated to hold at least one hearing and deliver its decision within
ten days of convening. The most reasonable package offer is determined
solely on the basis of four criteria: "the bargaining history of the parties,
relevant market comparisons in the private sector, relevant market com-
parisons in the public sector and the city's ability to pay".
23
Six contracts with the three bargaining units24 - the firefighters, police
and civilian employees have been negotiated under this procedure and are
briefly discussed.
1) The entire 1971-72 firefighters' contract went to arbitration. Major
issues included staffing standards and promotion, longevity pay and salary
scale, The city offered 6.0 per cent mainly in across-the-board increases and
6.5 per cent in a package stressing health and retirement benefits. The union
demanded 8.6 or 7.4 per cent packages with longevity and manning standards
included in both offers. The Board cited the unreasonableness of the manda-
tory staffing standards as justification for the rejection of the union's offers;
the first city offer was chosen out of consideration for the union's preference
for across-the-board increases.
2) The entire 1971-72 police contract was also submitted to arbitration.
The main disputed items were the scope of management rights and the wage
increase. The city offered 6.2 and 6.7 per cent packages; the union demanded
15.9 and 13.0 per cent. Informal feedback from the panel critical of the
211d.
22 G. Long and P. Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration: Sudden-Death in Eugene (1974),
27 Industrial and Labour Relations Rev. 192.
23 Id. at 192.
2 4 The unions are entitled: Eugene Fire-Fighters Association, International Asso-
ciation of Fire-Fighters Local 851 AFL-CIO (140 employees); Eugene Police Patrol-
men's Association (145 employees); American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees Local 1724A - AFSCME (300 employees).
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union's demand led to renegotiation and a settlement without an arbitration
award. The city's second offer was largely adopted with the economic adjust-
ment raised to 6.8 per cent.
3) The first American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Em-
ployees' contract in 1971-72 resulted in settlements of most issues, with the
exception of union security, as both parties wished to avoid arbitration. The
city wanted a maintenance of membership provision; the union demanded a
union shop. The city did not oppose the agency shop in principle. Rather it
felt compelled to oppose the proposal as a sizeable number of the employees
were non-union or even anti-union. The gratuitous fact-finding services of the
state were utilized instead of an arbitration panel and state officials examined
the submissions of the parties and other relevant data. However, as either
the union or city position had to be selected, the result in practical terms
was FOS.
4) The 1972-3 police contract (to run for two years) was settled without
recourse to arbitration, based on a 12 per cent over-all economic adjustment
and an innovative promotion policy.
5) The 1972-73 firefighters' contract was negotiated by the parties except
for the provision regarding longevity pay. The city offered a tax sheltered
annuity benefit of 3.0 per cent or an across-the-board increase of 2.8 per cent;
the union proposal amounted to 3.1 per cent. The city's across-the-board
offer was accepted by the arbitration panel; rejection of the other proposals
was grounded basically on the lack of comparable plans in the relevant labour
market.
6) The 1972-73 AFSCME negotiations resulted in consensus regarding
non-monetary items but the wage increase was submitted to arbitration. The
city's packages totalled 5.9 or 6.2 per cent; the union's 10.4 or 10.0 per cent,
both based on a one year agreement. Again, as a result of negative feedback
concerning the union proposal, direct negotiations were resumed and the
union settled for 13 per cent over the first two years and a wage reopener
for the third year of a three year deal.
It should be mentioned that the general context of union-management
relations in the city was conducive to productive negotiations, i.e., both sides
recognized the other's legitimacy and daily contact was cooperative, not
hostile. Further, the city council played a minimal role in bargaining and
there was, consequently, little politicizing of the issues; the personnel director
is the chief negotiator, reporting to the city manager. The financial position
of the city has been sufficiently healthy to avoid recourse to the criterion of
"ability to pay" and, hence, competition for the allocation of scarce resources
has been relatively absent.
3. Wisconsin
The State of Wisconsin enacted legislation in 197225 providing for final
25 Wis. Stat. Ann. 111.77 or Wis.L. 1971, c. 247 amended L. 1971, c. 307 amended
L. 1973, c. 64.
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offer arbitration to resolve contract disputes between local governments and
policemen, firefighters and county law enforcement officers. The scope of the
statute is limited to cities with populations between 2,500 to 500,000, thereby
excluding Milwaukee. Under the statute, either party may petition the Wis-
consin Employment Relations Commission to order arbitration; the Com-
mission, however, issues such a directive only if convinced, after intensive
mediation efforts during an investigation, that a genuine impasse has been
reached. While the parties may agree to utilize conventional arbitration, this
option is rarely exercised. Rather, the usual form is final offer selection on an
entire package basis. Guidelines for the arbitrators, identical with the
Michigan statute, 20 state that weight be given
to the lawful authority of the employer, stipulations of the parties, ability to pay.
cost of living; comparisons with other employees in the public and private sectors
doing similar work, comparisons with other employees generally in comparable
communities, and other factors which normally or traditionally are taken into
consideration in determining wages, hours and conditions of employment in the
private and public sectors.27
However, arbitrators largely rely on three of the nine criteria, namely, the
cost of living, the ability of the government unit to pay and the wage rates of
public employees in similar occupations in comparable communities.28 There
is some tendency for the first arbitrated decision to be rather high - in
effect, a catchup award - with later awards roughly following the cost of
living increase.29 The parties feel that the existence of arbitration is reducing
the disparity in wage rates both between communities and within each oc-
cupation, although data is not available to substantiate this.
The "inability to pay" argument has not been warmly received by
arbitrators who have not accepted the prior adoption of a budget for the
current fiscal year by the appropriate legislative body as establishing an
inflexible upper limit on the award.
Arbitrators generally appear to believe employees are entitled to wage and salary
increases that will keep them abreast with increases in the cost of living and
will bring them up eventually to comparable jobs in comparable communities. A
legitimate inability to pay argument creates a tendency for the arbitrator to
spread the period of time over which a community is given to become com-
parable with other communities. Rarely, however, has an arbitrator suggested
that inability to pay legitimizes substandard wages or reductions in real earnings
over the long run.30
The following table illustrates the pattern of contract settlement for the
police, firefighters and county law enforcement officers for the three years
since the final offer statute was introduced:
20 Mich. 1969 P.A. 312 amended Mich. 1972 PA. 127.
27 .L. Stern, Final Offer Arbitration - Initial Experience in Wisconsin (1974),
Monthly Labour Rev. 39. Also, D. Dennis and G. Somers (eds.), Arbitration 1974,
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators at 94.
28 C.M. Rebmus, Is a 'Final Offer' Ever Final? (1974) Monthly Labour Rev.
20 Dennis & Somers, supra, note 27 at 94.
00 Rehmus, supra, note 28 at 104.
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Number of Police, Firefighter,
and County Law Enforcement Officers Agreements Negotiated
and Number and Percent of These Agreements Resolved by
Mediation, Fact-Finding, and Arbitration
Number of bargains
No. of Mediationsa
No. of fact-finding petitions
No. of arbitration petitions
Total number of requests for
third party assistance
No. of fact-finding awards
No. of arbitration awards




1968-1971 1972 1973 1974c
427 143 173 147
52 22 13 9
64 12b -
- 14b 43 40
116 48 56 49
24 4 - -
- 7 16 1
24 11 16
1968-1971 1972 1973 1974c







Note: The number of bargains was calculated from the questionnaires and
adjusted to reflect the 70 per cent response rate and the number of two-year
agreements. The number of mediations, fact-finding and arbitration petitions,
and fact-finding and arbitration awards is taken from state records. Adjust-
ments were made in state figures to convert them from fiscal years to calendar
years, as municipal agreements run for calendar years.
aIrL order to avoid double counting, the number of mediation cases has
been reduced by those that were not settled at that step and were referred to
fact-finding or arbitration.
bWhen the 1972 amendments providing for arbitration were enacted,
there were still some situations in which the parties had not reached agree-
ment on their 1972 contracts. Fourteen of these, some of which had originally
been filed as fact-finding cases, resulted in arbitration petitions. The cases
which were refiled as arbitration cases have been subtracted from the fact-
finding cases to avoid double counting.
'As of April 1, 1974, there had been 49 petitions for third-party
assistance in negotiating 1974 agreements. Twenty-three petitions were
still pending at some step of the procedure. Therefore, although only one
award had been issued as of April 1, 1974, the total number that will be
issued is not yet known.81
Clearly, the parties continue to prefer to conclude negotiations themselves
rather than opt for a "simple" arbitrated decision. For example, of the 173
negotiations in 1973, two-thirds reached agreement without third party inter-
81 Id. at 85.
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vention; three-quarters of the remaining 56 disputes were resolved by the
parties during mediation either during the Commission's investigation or at
an arbitration hearing; only 9 per cent of the 173 negotiations (16 in all)
were settled by arbitral decree. As of April 1, 1974, the 147 disputes were
settled by the parties themselves in 98 cases (67 per cent); and of the 49
involving third party assistance, 25 were concluded via mediation, one by
arbitration and 23 were still pending at some stage in the process.
3 2
Of interest, also, is the following issue analysis of arbitration cases, based
on the 24 awards published by April, 1974:
Conventional Arbitration 1 (# cases) 11 (# issues)





*in 4 of the 7 the issue was wages33
Both interviews and examination of the awards suggest that final offer arbitra-
tion persuades the parties to reduce the number of issues to be arbitrated. 4
Further, "of the 173 bargains for 1973, agreements concluded under the
final offer arbitration statute, only about 3 or 4 involved (the) multiple
non-compatible issue dilemma".35 That is, the likelihood that each side will
present offsetting reasonable and unreasonable demands on different issues
apparently is more an academician's dilemma than practical problem.
Support for final offer selection over conventional arbitration or even
FOS on an issue by issue basis seems widespread among unions, manage-
ment and arbitrators. The box-score on awards is currently twelve to eleven
in favour of management.30
It must be remembered that the primary function of interest arbitration
is to equalize bargaining power where the right to strike is denied. It seems
as though the system of final offer selection is workable and acceptable as a
strike surrogate: the vast majority of the larger cities and counties that have
fallen within the framework of the FOS statute have established viable col-
lective bargaining relationships in which the parties ordinarily negotiate their
own settlements despite the fact that there is no right to strike.
37
4. Michigan
The Michigan final offer statute 8 is confined to economic issues in dis-
pute between local governments and police, firefighters and deputy sheriffs.
B2 Stem, supra, note 27 at 40.
33 Id. at 42.
3 4Id.
85 Id.
80 Id. at 43.
37 Dennis & Somers, supra, note 27 at 97.
38 Supra, note 26.
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While arbitral criteria are identical to those in the Wisconsin statute39, the
procedure differs significantly. However, as the model really approximates
mediation-arbitration, in that the parties are not required to outline their final
offers on the economic issues at any specific phase in the proceedings, the
discussion is minimal in this paper and is simply a sketch of the system.
The arbitration hearing is seen as a continuation of the negotiation
process; offers are modified in response to changes in the other side's pro-
posals and/or feedback from the arbitrator. Further, the arbitrator is em-
powered to remand the dispute for three more weeks of bargaining after the
formal hearing. The scanty data suggest that FOS coupled with the great
flexibility of the arbitrator to "mediate" first has increased the number of
"negotiated" contracts: "under conventional arbitration, in 39% of cases
where hearings were held, no award was necessary because a settlement
had been made during the arbitration proceeding. Under final offer thus far,
the comparable figure has jumped to 64% ".4 The rate of requests for arbitra-
tion, however, has remained the same under the earlier statute providing for
conventional arbitration and during the first eighteen months of the final
offer amendment.41 Acceptability seems to be high for both the management
and union sides, probably because the model really is "med-arb". In fact,
Stern indicates that the union representatives endorse the legislation whole-
heartedly but "none of them has said that the substitution of binding arbitra-
tion for fact-finding with advisory recommendations has, as far as they are
concerned, changed the bargaining process". 42 It should be noted that the
Michigan statute stipulates FOS on an item by item basis rather than entire
package, thus sidestepping the multiple non-compatible issue dilemma. While
it is an interesting example of a functioning "med-arb model", the Michigan
experience is of little value in evaluating FOS as an arbitral variant.
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR "FREE" COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The touchstone of any labour relations system is, of course, accept-
ability. Provided that the process yields results satisfactory to the parties
themselves, i.e., deals with the negotiations of the moment and preserves the
ongoing relationship of the bargainers, the design of the process should not
be required to contain an ideological bias. Yet a chief criticism of arbitral
systems reveals a decided moral judgment:
Experience - particularly the War Labour Board experience during the '40's -
shows that a statutory requirement that labour disputes be submitted to arbitra-
tion has a narcotic effect on private bargainers, that they tum to it as an easy -
and habit forming - release from the obligation of hard, responsible
bargaining.4 3
Apparently, for the parties to seek a "simple" solution to settling contract
3 9 Supra, note 25.
4o Supra, note 28 at 44.
41 Id. at 45.
42 Dennis & Somers, supra, note 27 at 95.
43 Stem, supra, note 27 at 40. Comment by W. Wirtz at 1963 meeting of the
National Academy of Arbitrators.
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disputes without recourse to or threat of economic punishment is in some
way "immoral".
Once one recognizes this ideological component - that "responsible"
bargaining must be conducted in the shadow of economic sanctions - one
may proceed to a more dispassionate examination of the functioning of the
final offer selection variant of the arbitration process.
It should be noted that the arbitration statutes in Wisconsin and
Michigan have not turned the bargainers in those states into "addicts" turning
to arbitration to "fix" their contract disputes. As shown by statistical studies
the overwhelming majority of contracts continue to be settled in the negotia-
tion stage with or without the services of a mediator. Furthermore, the
legislation is not viewed as a replacement of the collective bargaining pro-
cess, rather what is to be eliminated is the economic sanction possessed by
each party. It is only upon the failure of the "free" bargainers to conclude
an agreement that arbitration is invoked to break the impasse.
To be effective, the form of arbitration must indeed supply a "strike
surrogate". That is, the system must generate sufficient convergent pressures
to foster "good faith" bargaining and the desire of the parties to reach an
agreement. It is contended that final offer selection meets both these tests -
namely, acceptability and the "strike surrogate".
The acceptability of the arbitral decision is no doubt related to the
parties' perceptions of their input and control over the outcome. Several
comments made during the Wentworth interviews are worth noting here.
That is, both parties expressed the view that they had been given the "short
end of the stick" under conventional arbitration; the Board felt the arbitrator
perceived the taxpayer as a limitless source of revenue; the teachers saw
the arbitrator as overly sympathetic with the government's policy of expendi-
ture ceilings and felt that they were the whipping boy for the rest of society.
This seems to highlight a major weakness of conventional arbitration, that
is, that the "saw-off" approach, using a "cut-and-paste" pattern of settle-
ment, pleases neither party. Under final offer selection however, the parties
retain greater control over the arbitration process; the result is literally
dictated by one of the parties. Again, both negotiators in Wentworth com-
mented favourably on this feature of FOS. Yet both parties also reported that
their final positions were so close that the designation of "winner" or "loser"
was irrelevant. Indeed, the designated "loser", the Wentworth Board, was
highly pleased with the result and strongly favoured repeating the procedure
in the next round of talks. This sentiment was echoed by the Sault Board who
felt that conventional arbitration did not encourage good faith negotiations in
that extremism would likely be rewarded in any saw-off or "split the dif-
ference" settlement. It seems reasonable to infer that if the convergent pres-
sures are generated forcing the parties' final offers to closely approximate one
another, acceptability of the outcome should follow.
Nonetheless, that FOS produces a "winner" and a "loser" is most
frequently cited as a weakness; that is, obvious victories by one or other of
the parties would generate acrimonious relations over the long run. It is
contended, however, that the win-loss concept is endemic to the collective
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bargaining system and is by no means confined to FOS. To be sure, if the
negotiations proceed smoothly, trade-offs result in a collective agreement;
good will and cooperation are likely to abound in such serendipitous cir-
cumstances. But if each side wants what the other cannot or chooses not to
grant, the zero-sum game becomes apparent. That is, in a free collective
bargaining system, the final arbiter is the strike or lockout - and one side or
the other can better withstand the economic consequences. The strike has
been termed a catharsis, "clearing the air" of the workplace; but surely this
is to gloss over the real bitterness engendered by picket line violence, loss of
irreplaceable wages, decreased expectations, loss of faith in the bargaining
process and such like.
The win-loss concept may be viewed from another perspective as well:
the negotiators "win" if a bargain is concluded which is acceptable to the
union rank and file and/or senior management. Considerable effort must be
expended by negotiators to convince their respective constituencies that they
"won" at the bargaining table. And, occasionally, the negotiators will be
rebuffed and the proposed collective agreement retitled an unacceptable
losing position.
These comments cannot erase the fact that FOS does clearly designate
a "winner" and "loser". But it is felt that FOS merely reflects the broader
win-loss notion of the collective bargaining system and, in fact, by generating
convergent pressures, the parties, as in the Wentworth study, may be so close
together that animosity is lessened at the end of the arbitration process.
Finally, by forcing the parties themselves to compromise rather than risk
everything at arbitration, the result is likely more acceptable than if the
arbitrator had himself compromised the two positions to reach a settlement.
Final offer selection usually proceeds on an entire package basis rather
than item by item, the Michigan statute being the sole example of the latter
form in the case studies. The selectors in the Indianapolis arbitration chafed
under this curtailment of their discretion, preferring the "flexibility" of con-
ventional arbitration or at least item by item choice. However, the consensus
seems to be that the entire package route is more suitable in that an itemized
selection would permit the arbitrator to balance the award by selecting offers
from both parties:
the Eugene experience with entire package selection suggests that issue-by-issue
selection would permit the arbitrator to substitute his judgment for the com-
promises the parties could not or would not make at the table and to balance a
multi-issue award with something for each side, thus reducing the incentive to
avoid final offer arbitration.44
Should the parties wish to introduce greater flexibility into FOS, the Eugene
model of submitting two "final offers" seems commendable; the parties retain
control of the outcome but the device permits one offer to emphasize fringes,
the other across-the-board wage increases or to allow a "realistic" and
"political" submission to effect a settlement yet satisfy the constituents. More-
over, as indicated in the Wisconsin data, the multiple non-compatible issue
44 Long & Feuille, supra, note 22 at 39.
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dilemma appears extremely rarely in practice. The Sault Board also recom-
mended that either party be permitted to accept the final offer of the other
after presentation to the arbitrator but before an award. Such a procedure
might tend to encourage the arbitrator to mediate the dispute before selecting
the "winner" but, carefully framed, the proposal might well encourage the
parties to reach a settlement in the eleventh hour and without outside
intervention.
Final offer selection has other advantages over conventional arbitration
- it is less expensive and more expeditious. Since the arbitrator must select
one offer or the other, the evidentiary process is greatly shortened. The usual
procedure requires the submission of written argument, perhaps, rebuttal
and, if necessary, a brief hearing to clarify positions or update financial data..
Often, as in the Wentworth case, viva voce evidence is not adduced, while
the Sault hearing lasted roughly three hours. Conventional arbitration nor-
mally necessitates much more lengthy hearings - with consequent increased
costs to the parties. As mentioned earlier, Judge Shea, arbitrator for the
Wentworth dispute, declined to submit any fee for his services.
As FOS stresses "reasonableness" as the preeminent criterion for selec-
tion, it appears better to encourage openness in submission of briefs, i.e.,
releasing of the documents to the other party and the opportunity for rebuttal.
All parties favoured the appointment of a single arbitrator rather than a
tripartite board. This stance departs from the norm in Ontario whereby the
tripartite board is the predominant arbitration model as reported by Werry
and Carew.45 However, the tripartite board seems to derive its popularity
from the desire of the parties to have a nominee in close contact with the
chairman - who, under conventional arbitration, may shape the settlement
largely at his discretion. Under FOS, though, the chairman's role is confined
to selecting one or other of the offers. A nominee may be presumed to select
his own side's position rather than completely embrace the other party's view
and since there is no 'discretion' of the chairman to influence, the post of
nominee is superfluous - at best, a representative could reiterate the argu-
ments for adoption of his party's proposal already presented at the hearing
or in the written submissions. Theoretically, therefore, a single arbitrator
seems better suited for final offer selection. The utilization of a single arbitra-
tor also is more efficient and the parties all expressed a desire for a minimum
of delay in decision-making. Goldblatt's study4" indicates that the time in-
volved in the arbitration process is lengthened where tripartite boards are
involved. For example, the median time from the date the grievance was filed
to first hearing was four and a half months for a single arbitrator but six
months for a tripartite board; from the date of the final hearing to a majority
award, two and a half weeks and five weeks respectively; from the date the
grievance was filed to the date of the last award, six months and eight months
respectively. Goldblatt's data support the intuitive notion that one person
45 R. Werry and R. Carew, An Inquiry into the Preponderence of Tripartite
Arbitration Boards in Ontario (1971-72); 1 Queen's L. J. 67.
40 H. Goldblatt, Justice Delayed (Toronto: Carswell, 1973).
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usually reaches a decision in less time than three persons who must discuss
the matter. However, the delay involved is considerable even for a single
arbitrator to determine the issue. It must be noted, though, that the study
dealt with rights arbitration in the conventional arbitral form. It must be
remembered that final offer selection as discussed in this paper is interest
arbitration superimposed upon the collective bargaining process. The parties
are free to impose rigid time locks for presentation of submissions, length of
hearing, and the handing down of the award; the Wentworth study is a clear
example of such time limits being decided upon at the commencement of
negotiations and adhered to throughout. Again, one intuitively senses that the
time needed to select A or B is less than that needed to compromise A and B.
Thus, it is contended that the arbitration process under final offer selection
is both less time consuming because of the use of a single arbitrator rather
than a tripartite board and because of the design of the process itself.
The terms of reference regarding the criteria of selection varied from
the silence of the Sault instructions through the emphasis on "reasonableness"
in Wentworth to the detailed listings in the American statutes. It must be
stated, though, that the Sault teachers and both parties in Wentworth
elaborated criteria for selection in their written briefs. To the extent that the
parties do not embody specific criteria in their instructions, the arbitrator is
given discretion to "select" the criteria by which he will "select" the offer. It
has been suggested that the arbitrator should be confined to the evidence
submitted by the parties, viz., the judiciary's right to call expert testimony
and take notice of facts is not appropriate here:
A selector must make his choice of a final offer based on the evidence which
is presented to him. It is not his proper function to seek outside, independent
evidence on those matters which remain in dispute. It is up to the parties to
present their cases and it is not the selector's proper function to interject his
views on what evidence should be adduced nor to question the parties as to why
they have not seen fit to bring any particular type of evidence to him in support
of their offers.47
This view reflects a desire to afford greater control over the arbitration
process to the parties themselves in that, not only must the arbitrator choose
one offer or the other, but he must do so only on the basis of the evidence
presented by the parties and exclude outside influences. However, access to
information and data by the arbitrator is essential to a rational selection.
Prohibiting the arbitrator from seeking such data from responsible bodies
such as Statistics Canada and various governmental departments may have
significantly negative consequences for those small companies and/or unions
whose resources - financial and otherwise - are minimal and result in an
unsophisticated brief with meagre statistical backing for an otherwise
meretorious position. The Sault Board is a case in point. The Sault Board
suggested that either the government should set up such bureaux or
the school boards should organize to counterbalance the resources of
O.S.S.T.F. The establishment of impartial research bureaux for various in-
dustries and sectors of the economy under governmental auspices would
obviate much of the difficulty. The Pay Research Bureau for the federal pub-
47 G. Ferguson, supra, note 3 at 11.
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lie service and the police research bureau created by The Police Amendment
Act are examples of such data resource centres, available to aid both parties
in preparing their briefs and the arbitrator in choosing between them.
Written reasons for the arbitrator's selection were usually required or
requested. A reasoned argument for choosing one offer and rejecting the
other would seem to be valuable to the parties, both in increasing their con-
fidence in the instant decision and in providing some guidelines for future
negotiations. Manifestly irrelevant reasons for selection would likely afford
the aggrieved party an opportunity for judicial review, certainly under a
statutory system of final offer selection.
Final offer selection is intended to obviate the need for and prevent a
recourse to other economic sanctions such as the strike, lockout, work to
rule, etc. In preventing a test of economic strength, FOS may be considered
to afford some advantage to the weaker party. However, a system which
requires the subjugation of the weaker party despite a more compelling argu-
ment for its "offer" on the grounds of a brute force standard is hardly at-
tractive. Another criticism stresses the possibility that the arbitrator may be
forced to choose between two patently unreasonable offers whereas arbitral
discretion could shape a reasonable compromise or collective bargaining force
a test of strength. Firstly, it is suggested that the likelihood of such an
occurrence is remote. Few unions or companies would wish to risk everything
at arbitration - rather than compromise themselves. Further, even fewer
negotiators would risk losing face so dramatically - in front of both their
superiors and their counterparts - by backing the losing side. Consequently,
it is argued that the bargainers themselves have a vested interest in "closing
the gap" even if a collective agreement could not be reached. Secondly, the
result would likely be no better under conventional arbitration which would
probably impose a settlement unacceptable to either "unreasonable" party,
while collective bargaining would merely have one side eventually "knuckle
under". Finally, the criticism ignores the very real convergent pressures re-
ported in the case studies which are generated by FOS.
The experience in Wentworth and the United States supports the pro-
position that final offer selection reduces the number of issues - peripheral
items are eliminated. Even in the Sault case, four items were settled prior
to arbitration but after adoption of FOS. To be sure, the issues were not the
main contentious items; but that is the point - subsidiary clauses are settled
or dropped lest one's offer be adjudged unreasonable over a minor matter.
Thus, what proceeds to arbitration represents the core of the dispute.
Furthermore, if the FOS procedures were adopted in the ground rules
or from the outset of bargaining, the deadline for settlement would force the
parties closer together on the major issues lest an extreme demand taint an
otherwise reasonable offer. One senses that the Indianapolis case wherein
the entire package was rejected because of an "unreasonable" health care
requirement need only be experienced once to convince the parties to
moderate their demands in future. Posturing for effect - a valuable tactic
in bargaining - is of little assistance in formulating an offer attractive to a
third party looking for reasonableness. The Wentworth negotiators reported
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that contract talks were significantly less political and emotional than pre-
viously and the American case studies add weight to this view. In fact, final
offer selection has been referred to as "civilized bargaining".
Final offer selection would appear well suited in areas where the strike
and other such sanctions are inappropriate either for reasons of safety (e.g.
air traffic controllers, firefighters, etc.) or the reluctance of the parties them-
selves to invoke penalties because of consequences for others (e.g. teachers,
nurses and other professional groups). Negative impressions of conventional
arbitration, however, have "turned off" some to the possible FOS alternative.
The O.S.S.T.F., for example, has proposed a resolution prohibiting the use
of arbitration in any form in fashioning the Board-teacher contracts. Hope-
fully, the teachers' "victories" in the Wentworth and Sault cases may prevent
this form of dispute resolution from being discarded before a fair trial.
A labour relations system must resolve disputes effectively and in a
manner acceptable to the parties involved. The case studies herein support
the assertion that final offer selection seems to satisfy both criteria: the pro-
cedures provide a "strike surrogate" enhancing the possibility of a settlement
by the parties without recourse to arbitration and the results appear to be
acceptable both in terms of the immediate dispute and the ongoing employer-
employee relationship.
APPENDIX A: GROUND RULES IN THE WENTWORTH DISPUTE
11 All agreements made with respect to specific items shall only be tentative until
agreement has been reached on all items. Both parties agree that the ratification of any
offer or request is subject to the consent and acceptance of their respective bodies politic.
12 Any offer agreed to by both negotiating committees cannot be withdrawn in
whole or in part except when such change is mutually agreed upon by both Committees.
14 The Teachers' Committee shall have access to such Board records as are con-
sidered to be public information. As to further records, the Board Committee will
consider each request on its own merit. All requests are to be directed to the Chairman
of the Board Committee.
16 Third party intervention is acceptable in principle to both parties, in the form
of mediation followed, if necessary, by a form of Final Offer Selection mutually agreed
upon by both Committees.
18 Any of these ground rules may be set aside by mutual consent of the Chairmen.
26 In the event that final agreement has not been reached by the mediation, the
final offer and final request indicating outstanding negotiable items shall be referred to
a Selection Officer appointed in the following manner:
(a) Each Committee shall submit at a meeting called within three days for this
purpose, a list of four members of the judiciary prepared to serve as Selection Officer.
(b) A Selection Officer shall be appointed by mutual agreement OR failing agree-
ment, a Selection Officer shall be chosen from the lists by random selection at the
meeting in question.
27 Each submission shall indicate in three separate parts:
(a) the position of the appropriate committee at the point of reference to the
Mediator.
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(b) Any points of agreement reached during mediation.
(c) The final position of both parties.
Copies of such submissions are to be at the Office of the Selection Officer within
seven days of acceptance of appointment.
28 The Selection Officer may require written clarification of either submission but
may not accept any changes in the final positions submitted to him and shall decide
totally in favour of either submission.
2 0 The Selection Officer will convey his decision, which shall be binding on all
parties in writing, to both parties within thirty days of the final date for submission
under Clause 27. The Selection Officer will not be required to justify his decision beyond
stating that all evidence properly submitted was taken into consideration.
a0 Each party shall share equally the fee and disbursements of the Selection Officer.
31 As a pre-requisite condition of acceptance of the foregoing procedures, it is
agreed that no sanction, mass resignation, withdrawal of any normally performed
service, lockout or other action of a similar nature shall be imposed by either party.
APPENDIX B: COMPARISON OF THE BOARD AND TEACHERS' FINAL
OFFERS IN THE SAULT DISPUTE
Principals' Salaries
Board $25,735 to 27,835
Teachers 25,994 to 28,006
Vice-principals' Salaries
Board $22,060 to 24,160
Teachers 22,192 to 24,205
Extra Degree Allowance
Board $540 (M.A.) 755 (Ph.D.)
Teachers 559 783




Major Head 1,990 2,068
Minor Head 1,510 1,565
Occupational Training 595 615
Salary on the Grid (selected items)
Board Teachers
Group 1 $8,200 to 15,100 8,419 to 15,350
Group 2 8,530 to 15,800 8,754 to 16,077
Group 3 9,450 to 17,850 9,682 to 18,134
Group 4 9,960 to 19,190 10,207 to 19,509
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